Mailing-List: contact cygwin-developers-help AT sourceware DOT cygnus DOT com; run by ezmlm List-Subscribe: List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: , Sender: cygwin-developers-owner AT sources DOT redhat DOT com Delivered-To: mailing list cygwin-developers AT sources DOT redhat DOT com Message-ID: <00bc01c0c854$86049830$0200a8c0@lifelesswks> From: "Robert Collins" To: "egor duda" References: <20010418120530 DOT Q15962 AT cygbert DOT vinschen DOT de> <00a401c0c7f0$02bb1f30$0200a8c0 AT lifelesswks> <13327115627 DOT 20010418144700 AT logos-m DOT ru> <20010418155552 DOT S15962 AT cygbert DOT vinschen DOT de> <175340295909 DOT 20010418182640 AT logos-m DOT ru> <20010418164712 DOT J15005 AT cygbert DOT vinschen DOT de> <53342543912 DOT 20010418190408 AT logos-m DOT ru> <20010418173712 DOT N15005 AT cygbert DOT vinschen DOT de> <107348915634 DOT 20010418205020 AT logos-m DOT ru> <20010418202943 DOT O15005 AT cygbert DOT vinschen DOT de> <107356516774 DOT 20010418225701 AT logos-m DOT ru> Subject: Re: handle protection - please comment Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 08:11:30 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4133.2400 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 18 Apr 2001 22:04:02.0170 (UTC) FILETIME=[7A0A25A0:01C0C853] ----- Original Message ----- From: "egor duda" To: "Corinna Vinschen" Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2001 4:57 AM Subject: Re: handle protection - please comment > Hi! > > Wednesday, 18 April, 2001 Corinna Vinschen vinschen AT redhat DOT com wrote: > > >> now look what /tmp/secret contains. > > CV> I didn't test it but I assume it contains "Kaboom!". Hmm. I'm somewhat > CV> distressed about that result. So the secure way to get a handle to any > CV> shared object is by accessing it using names as suggested by Robert. > CV> This doesn't apply to parent/child relations, obviously. > > yes. or via trusted server process running under administrator > account. i suppose PSTORES.EXE (MS' "Protected storage service" is > used for somthing like this). Hmm.. could we use pstores? > RC>> The thing egor as talking about was child process's needing to read the > RC>> parents open handles, and that programs than setuid are apparently > RC>> setting the perms to everyone, all to allow the child process with it's > RC>> different uid to read the handles. He was proposing a server model, > > CV> Wouldn't that problem (which originally was related to ttys) be resolved > CV> if the master cares for the duplication? > > but slave may also care to not allow master to get into its address > space or read/write its files. yeah, it's slave, but that doesn't mean > it have no natural human (err, i mean process :-) ) rights. Well actually :}As the parent can't launch a process in a higher context that it is in..? Hmm, but what about setuid applications, a hacked bash for instance could launch ssh on the users request, and then get nasty... I think it matchs the unix model though - runner beware. > > Egor. mailto:deo AT logos-m DOT ru ICQ 5165414 FidoNet 2:5020/496.19 > > >